Is it likely that the pursuit of more “humane” animal treatment will eventually lead to the recognition that animals have the basic right not to be treated as things, and the consequent abolition of institutionalized animal use?

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No, it is not likely. Anticruelty laws requiring the humane treatment of animals have been popular in the United States and Great Britain for well over a hundred years, and we are using more animals in more horrific ways than ever before. Sure, there have been some changes. In some places, like Britain, veal calves get more space and some social interaction before they are slaughtered; in some American states, the leghold trap is prohibited and animals used for fur products are caught in “padded” traps or raised in small wire cages before they are gassed or electrocuted. Under the federal Animal Welfare Act, primates are supposed to receive some psychological stimulation while we use them in horrendous experiments in which we infect them with diseases or try to ascertain how much radiation they can endure before they become dysfunctional. Some practices, such as animal fighting, have been outlawed, but, as I have argued, such prohibitions tell us more about class hierarchy and prejudice than they do about our moral concern for animals. All in all, the changes we have witnessed as the result of animal welfare laws are nothing more than window dressing.

This should not surprise us. Anticruelty laws assume that animals are the property of humans, and it is in this context that the supposed balance of human and animal interests occurs. But as we saw, we cannot really balance the interests of property owners against their property because property cannot have interests that are protectable against the property owner. The humane treatment principle, as applied through animal welfare laws, does nothing more than require that the owners of animal property accord that level of care, and no more, that is necessary to the particular purpose. If we are using animals in experiments, they should receive that level of care, and no more, that is required to produce valid data. If we are using purpose-bred animals to make fur coats, they should receive the level of care, and no more, that is required to produce coats that are soft and shiny. If we are raising animals for food, those animals should receive that level of care, and no more, that is required to produce meat that can be sold at a particular price level to meet a particular demand. If we are using dogs to guard our property, we should provide the level of care that is required to sustain the dog for that purpose. As long as we give the dog the minimal food and water and shelter–a dead dog will not serve the purpose–we can tie that dog on a three-foot leash and we can beat him, even excessively, for “disciplinary” purposes.

We claim to acknowledge that the interest of animals in not suffering is morally significant, but our animal practices belie that claim. If we are really to honor the moral interests of animals, then we must abolish institutionalized animal exploitation and not merely regulate animal use through animal welfare measures that assume the legitimacy of the status of animals as property.

Isn’t taking advantage of medications or procedures developed through the use of animals inconsistent with taking an animal rights position?

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No, it is not. Those who support animal exploitation often argue that accepting the “benefits” of animal use is inconsistent with criticizing the use of animals.

This position, of course, makes no sense. Most of us are opposed to racial discrimination, and yet we live in a society in which white middle-class people enjoy the benefits of past racial discrimination; that is, the majority enjoys a standard of living that it would not have had there been a nondiscriminatory, equitable distribution of resources, including educational and job opportunities. Many of us support measures, such as affirmative action, that are intended to correct past discrimination. But those who oppose racial discrimination are not obligated to leave the United States or to commit suicide because we cannot avoid the fact that white people are beneficiaries of past discrimination against people of color.

Consider another example: assume that we find that the local water company employs child labor and we object to child labor. Are we obligated to die of dehydration because the water company has chosen to violate the rights of children? No, of course not. We would be obligated to support the abolition of this use of children, but we would not be obligated to die. Similarly, we should join together collectively and demand an end to animal exploitation, but we are not obligated to accept animal exploitation or forego any benefits that it may provide.

We certainly could develop drugs and surgical procedures without the use of animals, and many would prefer we do so. Those who object to animal use for these purposes, however, have no control as individuals over government regulations or corporate policies concerning animals. To say that they cannot consistently criticize the actions of government or industry while they derive benefits from these actions, over which they have no control, is absurd as a matter of logic. And as a matter of political ideology, it is a most disturbing endorsement of unquestioned obeisance to the policies of the corporate state. Indeed, the notion that we must either embrace animal exploitation or reject anything that involves animal use is eerily like the reactionary slogan “love it or leave it,” uttered by the pseudo-patriots who criticized opponents of American involvement in the Vietnam War.

Moreover, humans have so commodified animals that it is virtually impossible to avoid animal exploitation completely. Animal by-products are used in a wide variety of things, including the asphalt on roads and synthetic fabrics. But the impossibility of avoiding all contact with animal exploitation does not mean that we cannot avoid the most obvious and serious forms of exploitation. The individual who is not stranded in a lifeboat or on a mountaintop always has it within her power to avoid eating meat and dairy products, products that could not be produced without the use of animals, unlike drugs and medical procedures, which could be developed without animal testing.

If we adopt a vegan diet, animals will inevitably be harmed when we plant vegetables, and what is the difference between raising and killing animals for food and unintentionally killing them as part of a plant-based agriculture?

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When we plant crops, we will inevitably displace and possibly kill sentient animals when we plant vegetables. Surely, however, there is a significant difference between raising and killing animals for food and unintentionally doing them harm in the course of planting vegetables, an activity that is itself intended to prevent the killing of sentient beings.

In order to understand this point, consider the following example. We build roads. We allow people to drive automobiles. We know as a statistical matter that when we build a road, some humans–we do not know who they are beforehand–will be harmed as the result of automobile accidents. Yet there is a fundamental moral difference between activity that has human harm as an inevitable but unintended consequence and the intentional killing of particular humans. Similarly, the fact that animals may be harmed as an unintended consequence of planting vegetables, even if we do not use toxic chemicals and even if we exercise great care to avoid harming animals, does not mean that it is morally acceptable to kill animals intentionally.

Moreover, because it takes so many pounds of plants to produce one pound of animal protein, we actually kill more animals in crop production when we are feeding those crops to animals rather than consuming the crops directly. So a vegan diet results in many fewer of those unintended and incidental deaths.

A related question is: why don’t plants have rights given that they are alive? This is the question that every vegetarian gets in the company of a nonvegan. These nonvegans may be otherwise rational and intelligent beings, but when confronted with a vegetarian, their discomfort with their diet often rises to the surface in the form of defensiveness.

No one really thinks that plants are the same as sentient nonhumans. If I ate your tomato and your dog, you would not regard those as similar acts. As far as we know, plants are not sentient. They are not conscious and able to experience pain. Plants do not have central nervous systems, endorphins, receptors for benzodiazepines, or any of the other indicia of sentience. Plants do not have interests; animals do.

If we want to treat similar interests similarly, does our recognition that animals have a basic right not to be property mean that abortion should also be prohibited?

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Abortion raises a number of difficult issues, particularly because of the religious dimension of the controversy. Many who oppose abortion believe that ensoulment occurs at the moment of conception. This belief leads some abortion opponents to oppose any measure that will interfere with the subsequent development of the fetus, including the use of intrauterine devices or drugs that prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum on the uterus wall. As far as these abortion opponents are concerned, the fact that a fetus or fertilized ovum is not sentient is irrelevant; the fetus has spiritual “interests” and is considered a full and complete moral being in the eyes of God as soon as it possesses a soul.

Another complicating factor in the abortion debate is that as a cultural matter the status of a pregnant woman as a “mother” and of a fetus as a “baby” tends to kick in immediately after the woman learns that she is pregnant, particularly in cases in which the woman wants to have a child. That is, from the moment of conception, or learning of conception, we tend to think of the fetus as the human person–the baby–that it will become. But that characterization does not alter the biological fact that a fertilized ovum does not have interests in the way that the baby does.

If we approach the abortion question outside the framework of religion and souls, and outside social conventions that characterize a pregnant woman as a “mother” and a fetus as a “baby” from the moment of conception, it becomes much more difficult to understand how fetuses–particularly early-term fetuses–may be said to have interests. Although it is not certain that any fetuses are sentient, it is clear that early-term fetuses are not, and therefore they do not have interests in not suffering–they cannot suffer. Moreover, it is not clear how nonsentient fetuses can have an interest in continued existence. Although a normal fetus will continue to term and result in the birth of a human person, the nonsentient fetus cannot itself have an interest in continued existence.

Sentient beings are those who are conscious of pain and pleasure; those with some sort of mind and some sense of self. The harm of death to a sentient being is that she or he will no longer be able to have conscious experiences. If you kill me painlessly while I am asleep, you have harmed me because you have deprived me of having further experiences as a sentient being that I, by virtue of the fact that I have not chosen to commit suicide, wish to have. And our experience of sentient beings other than humans reasonably supports the position that allsentient beings share in common an interest in continuing to live–sentience is merely a means to the continued existence of organisms who are able to have mental experiences of pleasure and pain. We cannot analogize a fetus and a sleeping person; the fetus has never been sentient and therefore has never possessed the interests that are characteristic of all sentient beings.

If we claim that a nonsentient fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence simply because there is a high degree of probability that in nine months it will become a child with interests, then we are committed to the view that a fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence immediately upon conception. And if we can say that a fertilized ovum has an interest in continued existence immediately upon conception, it becomes difficult to understand why we would not also say that a sperm and an egg have interests in conception before their union occurs. The primary difference between the fertilized ovum, and the sperm and egg, concerns probability (it is more probable that a fertilized ovum will eventually become a human baby than it is that any particular sperm will fertilize an egg), and nothing more.

To the extent that we might say, for instance, that it is in the “interest” of the fetus that the pregnant woman not smoke cigarettes during pregnancy, such an assertion is no different from saying that it is in the “interest” of an engine to be properly lubricated or of a plant to be watered. Although it may be prudent for the pregnant woman not to smoke if she has an interest in having a healthy baby (just as it is prudent for us to put oil in our cars or to water our plants), the nonsentient fetus does not yet have an experiential welfare and does not prefer or want or desire anything. In the absence of a religious belief about the ensoulment of fetuses, it is difficult to understand why the abortion of an early-term fetus is morally objectionable or how abortion can be considered a harm to a nonsentient fetus. If the abortion of a nonsentient fetus is morally objectionable, then so would be the use of intrauterine devices or drugs, such as RU 486, that prevent the attachment to the uterine wall of a fertilized ovum. And we may be committed to the view that a sperm and an egg have an interest in being united so that the use of contraception violates the interests of the sperm and the egg. Again, in the absence of a religious framework, such views appear quite untenable.

What if we determine that some fetuses are sentient? Certainly, late-term fetuses react to certain stimuli. It may be the case that such fetuses are sentient and have an experiential welfare. In this case, it would make sense to say that such fetuses have interests. But even if we assume that sentient fetuses have a basic right that prevents their wholly instrumental treatment, abortion presents a most unusual conflict of rights. One right holder exists within the body of another right holder and is dependent upon her for the very existence that serves as the predicate for the fetus having interests in the first place. Such a conflict is unique, and protection of fetal interests risks state intrusion on the woman’s body and privacy interests in a way that no other protection of the basic right of another requires. If a parent is abusing her three-year-old, the state may remove the child in order to protect the child’s interests. The state cannot protect fetal interests without intruding on the bodily autonomy of the woman and forcing her to continue an unwanted pregnancy. But it may be the case that the sentience of fetuses militates in favor of abortion methods that are equally safe for the woman but that preserve the life of the fetus.

How do I know a product is plant-only?

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Reading the list of ingredients is not always enough to determine whether a product is plant-only:

  • Many food, cosmetic, and clothing ingredients use names that do not make it clear that they are animal-derived.
  • Many micro-ingredients can be made from either plant or animal sources. Glycerides, l-cysteine, lecithin and similar ingredients for example, can be source from animal products or plant sources.
  • Natural flavoring, spices, seasoning, dyes and other seemingly innocuous ingredients — even vitamins — may contain animal products or be derived from animal sources.
  • Many products use animal ingredients during their processing, even if the final product does not contain animal products. Cane sugar, for example, is bleached in many parts of the United States and other parts of the world using animal bone charcoal. Alcohol, such as red wine and beer, are often filtered with egg albumen or isinglass (derived from fish bladders).
  • “Synthetic”, “fake”, “natural”, “organic” and other modifiers do not guarantee that a product is free from animal use.

The following, however, are some of the more common ingredients almost always derived from animal sources.

Albumen
Ambergris
Carmine
Casein
Down
Gelatin
Isinglass
Lanolin
Pepsin
Propolis
Suet
Tallow
Whey

Further, because a product is plant-only in one locale, it does not guarantee that it is plant-only in another. Checking the source of micro-ingredients with the local manufacturer of a product is the best way to determine the source.

Many cereals in the United States, for example, are fortified with animal-derived Vitamin D3. This is not the case in many other other countries, even when the brand of cereal is the same. A product might be sweetened with high fructose corn syrup in the United States, cane sugar in Canada, and beet sugar in Britain.

Even the same product in the same country may be problematic.  For example, the same product in the United States may be sweetened with animal bone charcoal bleached sugar one month, and cane sugar bleached using a different method another month, depending on how the company sources its sugar.

it is also often important to check with the local manufacturer rather than the parent company. Many commercial products are also produced under license internationally. A product may be manufactured and distributed by an entirely different company, one country to the next. Contacting a main or corporate office in a different country may provide you with the wrong information.

In short, if you don’t understand all of the ingredients in a product or are unsuare whether those ingredients involve animal use that’s practicable and possible for you to avoid, that’s a good reason to check with the manufacturer or avoid using it.

What are the common dietary recommendations for vegans?

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The nutritional requirements of individuals vary, and scientific understanding of nutrition continues to evolve.  The consistent recommendation from health and dietary organization is that vegans should  (1) ensure intake of an appropriate amount of calories overall for age, sex, lifestyle, etc., and (2) eat a varied diet with foods rich in calcium, iron, vitamin D, vitamin B12, zinc and other nutrients. The following is not a complete list:

  • Protein: Plant sources of protein include soy and wheat products (e.g., tofu, tempeh and seitan), beans, lentils, nuts, and seeds. (1)
  • Calcium: Plant sources of calcium include tofu, kale, turnip, collard and mustard greens, bok choy, sesame seeds, tahini and black strap molasses. (2)
  • Iron: Plant sources of iron include various beans, tofu, spinach, raisins, and black strap molasses. (3)
  • Zinc: Plant sources of zinc include beans, cashews, chickpeas, sesame seeds, tahini, and pepitas. (4)
  • Vitamin D. Plant sources of vitamin D include sunlight!  But also mushrooms grown in sunlight and foods fortified with Vitamin D2. (5) Note, however, that most sources of Vitamin D3 are not plant-derived.
  • Vitamin B12. Plant sources of B12 include B12 fortified soy, rice and nut milks, breakfast cereals and other foods, as well as nutritional yeast. (6)
  • Omega-3 Fatty Acids. Plant sources of Omega-3s include flax seeds, walnuts, soy beans, canola and soy oil, among others. (7)

Whole foods are a good source of varied nutrition. It’s worth noting, however, that one cup of many common brands of fortified plant milks provides 45% calcium, 30% vitamin D, and 50% vitamin B12 of the daily intake requirements. Many cereals are fortified in the United States and Canada. Fortification for cereals, plant milks and other foods, however, vary by brand and by region. Many products not be fortified at all.  Be sure to check the label for nutritional information.

Supplements for B12, Omega-3 Fatty Acids and other vitamins and minerals are available. Blood tests through your physician can help you determine whether you are getting ample amounts of iron, B12 and other concerns over time. General nutritional guidance shouldn’t replace consultation with an appropriate health professional to discuss your dietary needs if you have any concerns.

  1. See http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-living/nutrition-and-healthy-eating/in-depth/vegetarian-diet/art-20046446?pg=2
  2. See http://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/calcium#h2
  3. See http://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/Iron-HealthProfessional#h2
  4. See http://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/Zinc-HealthProfessional#h3
  5. See http://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/VitaminD-HealthProfessional
  6. See http://ods.od.nih.gov/factsheets/VitaminB12-HealthProfessional#h3
  7. See http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-living/nutrition-and-healthy-eating/in-depth/vegetarian-diet/art-20046446?pg=2

Is it necessary to eat animal products to be healthy?

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Many health organizations worldwide, including the American Dietetic Association, have affirmed that a well-planned vegan diet can be healthy. In a 2009 position paper, the American Dietetic Association indicated that:

“It is the position of the American Dietetic Association that appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful, nutritionally adequate, and may provide health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases. Well-planned vegetarian diets are appropriate for individuals during all stages of the life cycle, including pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, and adolescence, and for athletes.”  (1)

Any unbalanced, unhealthy diet may lead to health problems.  Planning and balance are important, even for vegans. It’s possible to be vegan and unhealthy, but the fact remains: you can be healthy on a well-planned vegan diet.

For further confirmation and information:

1. Journal of the American Dietetic Association, July 2009. 109(7): 1266- 1282.

Pepper, tomato and onion stew (lecsó) with black lentils and kale

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Inspired by lecscó, my version adds a little nuance with the poblano pepper and rounds the dish out with some kale and black lentils. Shown here with freshly made spätzle (gluten free, plant-only) dusted with nutritional yeast, but fresh bread, roasted or mashed potatoes, rice or similar accompaniments should all go well.

Ingredients

1/3 cup black beluga lentils
3/4 cup water
1 ‘sprig’ dried kombu (about 1/2″)
4 scallions, minced (about 1/2 cup)
1/4t coarse sea salt
1 cup red peppers, cored, seeded, 1/3″ dice
1 cup Hungarian peppers, cored, seeded, 1/3″ dice
3/4 cup poblano peppers, cored, seeded, 1/3″ dice
1/2T smoked paprika
1/2T coconut sugar (or a little maple syrup)
1/2T lemon juice
1 cup tomato passata (or puree)
1/2 cup vegetable stock
2 cups green curly kale, stemmed and chopped
Coarse sea salt and black pepper to taste

Optional: There are a number of regional variations for lecsó, but tomatoes, onions, and peppers form a common base. Use some fresh tomatoes, slice the peppers and onions in strips rather than dice and use green pepper rather than poblano for a more traditional version. If you do, saute the onions first, add the paprika and sugar and then the rest of the peppers. Lecsó is often stewed. You ca make this dish in a slow cooker if you prefer (just be careful not to overcook the peppers). A tablespoon of cooking oil will also add some richesse to this dish.

Method

Bring the water to a boil in a small pan with a lid. Add the lentils and kombu. Reduce heat to low, cover and simmer for 30 minutes or until all the water has been absorbed. Remove the kombu and set the lentils aside to cool for 5 minutes, covered.

With the lentils underway, bring a large frying pan to heat on medium high. Add the peppers, scallions and sea salt. Stirfry for 3-5 minutes, or until the peppers are starting to wilt. Reduce heat to medium. Add the paprika and coconut sugar. Saute for 3-5 minutes.

When the pan starts to brown, add the lemon juice and deglaze. Add the passata and stock, and return to a simmer. Reduce heat to medium low and simmer for about 20 minutes uncovered or until the passata has been reduced by about 1/3, stirring periodically (but gently).

When ready, add the kale and black lentils. Stir to combine. Let stand 2-3 minutes to cool and to wilt the kale. Season to taste and serve.

Miso soup with tofu, shiitake mushrooms and kale

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Simple and nourishing, this makes 4 small bowls or 2 large ones.

Ingredients

1T water
2 scallions, minced about 4″ green reserved for garnish
1 cup shiitake mushroom caps, stemmed and sliced 1/4″
250g tofu, 1/4″ cubes
1T tamari
1T lemon juice
4 cups water
1 ‘spring’ dried kombu, about 1″
2-3T red miso (use low sodium if you can find it)
1 cup green kale, stemmed and coarsely chopped
Coarse sea salt to taste
1/2 cup purple carrots, matchsticked

Optional: 1/2t toasted sesame oil add some additional flavour to this dish, and a teaspoon of white sesame seeds will add colour, flavour and nutrition. I often add nori flakes to mine as a garnish as well. White and yellow miso often have a milder flavor than red. Regular orange carrots are also fine for this dish and add a lovely colour contrast.

Method

Bring a medium pan to heat on medium high heat. Add the scallions and water and stir fry for 1 minute. Add the shiitake and tofu stir fry for 2 minutes.
Add the tamari and lemon and deglaze the pan. Stir fry for another 2 minutes or until most of the moisture has been absorbed, the tofu is lightly browning, and the pan is starting to dry again.

Add water and kombu. Bring to a gentle simmer and simmer 5 minutes. Remove from heat, remove the kombu, add the miso and stir to combine. If you’re new to miso, add 2T to start and add more to taste. Add the kale and stir to combine.

Let stand a minute to wilt the kale lightly. Season to taste. Ladle out. Garnish with scallion greens sliced on an angle and the matchsticked carrots, and serve.

Note, miso ‘tea’ also makes a light, simple snack or breakfast. Bring a cup or so of water to a boil, pour over a 2-3 teaspoons of miso in a mug, and stir until dissolved.

 

Tomato, artichoke drop soup with brown rice and kale

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A warm and filling soup. The tapioca binds the artichoke and tofu into a nice, lightly chewy drop dumpling. This makes 4 small bowls or 2 large ones.

Ingredients

For the soup
1/4 cup long-grain brown rice
4 cups vegetable stock
2 cups tomato passata (or tomato puree)
1/4 cup scallions, minced, with about 4″ green reserved for garnish
1T garlic
1/2T dried basil, rubbed
1t dried oregano, rubbed
1/2t dried thyme, rubbed
1T lemon juice
1/4t black pepper, freshly ground
2 cups green curly kale, stemmed and coarsely chopped
2T nutritional yeast
1/2 cup carrots, matchsticked (I use purple carrots)
Sea salt and black pepper to taste.

For the artichokes
120g extra firm, high quality tofu
1/4t coarse sea salt
1/2 cup artichoke hearts (not jarred)
1/4 cup tapioca flour
1/2t dried ground turmeric
1/2t baking powder
1/4 cup cold water

Optional: Replace the basil, oregano, and thyme with a tablespoon of “Italian herbs” mix or herbes de Provence.


Method

In a large pan with a lid, toast the rice for 2-3 minutes on medium high. Add the stock, return to a simmer, cover reduce heat to low and simmer for 30 – 40 minutes until the rice is soft. Add the passata, herbs and spices to the soup. Cover and simmer another 10 minutes.

While the soup finishes, puree the artichoke ingredients until smooth. Uncover the soup and increase the heat to medium to return the soup to a light boil. Scoop about 1T artichoke mixture onto a spoon and drop into the soup. Repeat (quickly) until all of the mixture has been dropped.

Simmer for another 2 minutes (be sure not to overcook). Add the kale and nutritional yeast. Stir to combine. Add the carrots, reserving a few for garnish if you like. Let stand 2 minutes to cool. Season to taste. Ladle out, garnish with scallion green sliced on an angle and serve.